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Abstract 
 
 
This paper explores the relationship between bank market concentration and financial stability of financial institutions 
relying on highly territorially disaggregated data taken at municipality level in Italy between 2001 and 2012. Firstly, we 
test the existence of a U-shaped relationship between market concentration and financial stability. Secondly, we 
estimate the impact of the level of concentration of the banking system and other explanatory variables, such as size, 
level of capitalization and credit insolvency of financial institutions, on a proxy of risk taking behavior such as the 
banking ‘‘stability inefficiency’’ derived simultaneously from the estimation of a stability stochastic frontier.	The paper 
concludes that the inefficiency of financial stability is U-shaped relationship with respect to the measure of market 
concentration. Boosting market power increases bank failure in very concentrated markets while leads to higher 
financial stability in already competitive markets. Bank size is an essential factor in explaining this relationship as the 
effect of size on the inefficiency of stability is an inverse U-shaped as a function of the market share indicator; results 
also suggest that high, low and average concentration levels do not change the positive effects that the level of 
capitalization has on the stability inefficiency. 
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I. INTRODUCTION, MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION 
 
The different level of banking market structure is an important topic in the literature given its effects on 
financial stability (Beck et al. 2006; Schaeck et al. 2009; Wagner, 2010). However, this relationship is not clear yet and 
theory and empirical evidence seem to be inconclusive (Mirzaei et al., 2013), with conflicting and ambiguous findings 
(Canoy et al. 2001; Carletti and Hartmann, 2003; Allen and Gale, 2004; Anginer et al. 2014). Higher competition might 
compromise the solvency of some institutions, thus hampering the stability of the banking system at aggregate level. 
Banks, consequently and in order to keep their profits unaltered, could take riskier policies increasing the likelihood of 
failure. This negative relationship between the number of banks in the market and the average banks’ credit quality is 
explained by the fact that when banks compete for deposits, interest rates fall and, due to the contraction of banks’ 
franchise values, banks have less to lose and therefore undertake more risk taking strategies (Marcus, 1984). On the 
other hand, in parallel with deposit market, banks also compete in the loan market; loan rate as a consequence might 
decline, raising borrowers’ profits and making bankruptcy less likely. In other words, competition in the loan market 
lowers bank risk by reducing the risk-taking incentives of borrowers (Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005). 
More specifically, in the last years, two are the main lines of research trying to illustrate the role of the market 
power on the risk of financial institution’s failure and on the banking system stability. Part of the literature supports the 
“concentration-stability” view, according to which banks may have higher profits in collusive market. Indeed, in a more 
competitive market, banks may be incentivized to take more risky behaviors due to the fact that higher competition 
reduces the gains of both financial institutions and stakeholders (Keeley, 1990). Banks are induced to take riskier 
behaviors also because in more competitive markets they are more exposed to contagion as, in case of bank bankruptcy, 
also other banks exposed or close in business with the failed institution might also go bankrupt. In other words, banks 
are price-takers under perfect competition and there aren’t incentives to provide liquidity to the troubled bank, helping 
the contagion to spread (Allen and Gale, 2004). The presence of a high number of banks in the market also increases the 
chance that a poor quality borrower applies for a loan; as a consequence, the quality of the loan portfolio of the whole 
banking market decreases. In more concentrated system banks tend to be larger, (consequently) better diversified and 
therefore less fragile than in banking system with many small banks (i.e., more competitive systems) (see Beck et al. 
2006; Allen and Gale, 2000; 2004). Fewer banks means also an easier monitoring procedure and a more effective 
supervision which in turn will make the risk of contagion and systematic crisis less pronounced in concentrated banking 
systems. This view has been challenged by the “concentration-fragility” view according to which, instead, a more 
collusive banking market increases financial fragility. Indeed, bank market power in the deposit market induces banks 
to increase the cost of borrowing for entrepreneurs; their default risk will increase as a consequence of the fact that 
entrepreneurs are hindered to undertake more risky projects. The higher default risk of entrepreneurs shifts on the 
financial institutions and weakens bank financial security (Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005). In other words, in more 
concentrated markets, banks will charge higher interest rates, boosting the risk-taking behaviour of borrowers, leading 
therefore to an increase in the probability of default. This is what Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) called “shifting effect” 
being a monotonic declining relationship between competition and bank risk (i.e. as the number of banks and 
competition increase, the level of bank risk would decline). More competition leads to lower loan rates and to lower 
firm default probabilities, finally improving bank risk measures. More concentrated markets are associated with higher 
capital ratios, higher income volatility and higher insolvency of banks, supporting the idea that even though banks 
detain more capital in less competitive markets, their level of capitalization is not high enough to counterbalance the 
impact of default risk of higher risk taking institutions (Soedarmono et al. 2013). Exploring the relationship between 
bank market concentration and stability of financial institutions could help academics and regulators to formulate 
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effective policies to contrast financial instability; at the same time, it could also be helpful for understanding which 
market conditions may make managers more efficient (reducing risk-taking), guaranteeing stability of the financial 
sector and preventing the proliferation of negative events that increase the probability of defaults. 
The paper addresses the following research questions: Is there a linear relationship between market 
concentration and risk-taking behavior of banks? Does the Italian banking sector support the “concentration-stability” 
or the “concentration-fragility” theory? What effects does the institutional environment have on the market 
concentration-financial stability relationship? More specifically, this paper contributes to the recent literature as 
follows: (i)	 it uses the technique suggested by Lind and Mehlum (2010) and tests the existence of a U-shaped 
relationship between bank concentration and financial stability in order to validate the use of both the market share 
index and the square of market share index. Do not take this into account might lead to misleading results and policy 
implications. In order to measure the level of concentration of the market, we rely on the “structure-conduct-
performance” (SCP) paradigm assuming that banks operating in concentrated markets have higher profits due to 
monopoly rents (see Section II for more details). We rely upon a highly territorially disaggregated market share index 
calculated on bank specific loans, deposits and assets taken at municipality level (at SLL, Sistema Locale del Lavoro, 
level), being enable to better capture the differences across geographical areas. Financial stability is calculated through 
the z-score being a widespread accounting measure used to capture bank stability in the banking system (Boyd and 
Graham, 1986, 1988; Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Maechler et al., 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 
2009; Fink et al., 2009; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Houston et al., 2010; Beck et al. 2012; Fiordelisi and 
Mare, 2014); (ii) it examines the relationship between bank concentration and financial stability and determines whether 
the “concentration-stability” or “concentration-fragility” theory holds for a rich sample of cooperative, commercial and 
popular banks in Italy over the 2001-2012 period, by regressing a bank’s risk-taking proxy against the market share 
indicator. We use as risk-taking measure the “stability inefficiency” (see Fang et al. 2011; Tabak et al. 2012) whose 
estimation approach is the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA); (iii) as only few studies, to the best of our knowledge, 
examine cooperative banking and investigate the concentration-stability link among these credit institutions (among the 
few exceptions see Hesse and Cihák, 2007; Liu et al. 2012; Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014), this study considers both 
cooperative and non-cooperative banks. Specific attention has been paid on cooperative banks because of their mission 
in favour of the local community. Indeed, Italian cooperative banks are characterized by small size and a very local 
attitude. Their activity is mainly based in favour of members and aim at supporting the moral, cultural and economic 
development of the local community; moreover, they have an important role in financing households, artisans and small 
businesses. We believe that due to this particularly local community focused mission, it is important to examine 
whether the link between market concentration and financial stability differs when cooperative banks are taken into 
account. The analysis is performed using a rich database of Italian banks counting on a very homogeneous political, 
cultural and monetary environment; (iv) finally, in order to assess and to shed some light on the differences of stability 
inefficiency across several bank-specific variables, the paper explores the role played by the level of capitalization 
(proxied by the ratio of equity to total assets), bank size (proxied by the log level of total assets) and credit insolvency 
(proxied by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans); more specifically, as an additional check, we analyze 
whether the concentration-financial stability relationship changes as a results of other factors related to the institutional 
environment. 
In order to anticipate our findings, the empirical evidence is in favour of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between the market share index and financial stability suggesting the use of both the market share index and the square 
of market share index. When the “stability inefficiency” has been used as a risk-taking measure, the results show that 
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the inefficiency of financial stability is U-shaped relationship with respect to the measure of market concentration, 
suggesting that the increase in concentration does not lead to a linear change in inefficiency of the financial stability. 
The empirical evidence seems to support both the “concentration-fragility” view, according to which a high market 
power is detrimental to the stability of the market system (Beck et al. 2006; Shaeck et al. 2009; Liu et al. 2012; 
Fiordelisi and De Mare, 2014) at already high level of concentration and the “concentration-stability” view, as at low 
values of market concentration new entry decrease the probability of failure (Keeley, 1990; Allen and Gale, 2000; 2004; 
Beck et al. 2006; Matsuoka, 2013). Results also show that bank size is the most influential variable on this relationship 
as we find that the effect of size on financial stability is an inverse U-shaped as a function of the market share indicator. 
Robustness check has been performed	 measuring the level of market power using the loans, deposits and assets 
activities	and exploring whether the level of disaggregation at which we measure the market share index - community, 
province or regional level - may affect the results. 
This paper is structured in the following way. Section II brefly review the literature on the measurement of 
market concentration; Section III describes the empirical approach adopted in order to test the presence of a U-shaped 
between bank market concentration and financial stability and the empirical approach used to calculate the impact of 
bank concentration on inefficiency of financial stability. Section IV describes the data and variables for the analysis. 
Section V shows the main findings while Section VI performs some robustness checks. Finally, Section VII concludes. 
 
 
II. MEASURING MARKET CONCENTRATION 
The literature on the measurement of market concentration considers both structural and non-structural 
approaches; while the former one – the Structure-Conduct-Paradigm (SCP) - aims at measuring the degree of 
concentration from the structure of the market, the latter one – New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) - instead, 
directly assesses the conduct of firms. More specifically, the SCP paradigm, initially developed by Mason (1939) and 
Bain (1956), uses concentration measures as proxies for competition assuming that banks operating in concentrated 
markets have higher profits due to monopoly rents (Lloyd-Williams et al. 1994; Berger and Hannan, 1998). The SCP 
hypothesis argues that bank concentration and other impediments to competition create an environment that affects 
bank conduct and performance in unfavourable way from a social point of view and aims to explain aspects of the 
conduct and performance of banks in term of the structural characteristics of the market in which they operate. Three 
are the main used measures of concentration such as the number of firms (easy to perform but it does not take into 
account the distribution of firms), the concentration ratios (easy to be performed and limited data demanding) and the 
Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (requires information on the entire distribution and incorporated each firm individually). 
On the other hand, the NEIO method is the alternative approach based on the assumption that the conduct of firms in 
the market is directly observed.  Among the main indicators concerning this approach are the Lerner index (it measures 
the market power by the divergence between the firm’s price and its marginal cost), the Panzer-Rosse index (making 
use of the transmission of input prices on firms' revenues) and lastly the Boone indicator (based on the idea that 
efficient firms are more highly rewarded in more competitive markets). See Leon (2014) for an exaustive review of 
each index advantages and shortcomings. The feasible specification for the cost function necessary to the estimation of 
the indexes proposed by the NEIO approach will probably be different to that of the estimation of the cost efficiency. 
These market competition indicators are constructed using a Translog formulation and then there is a high probability 
that are correlated with bank performance. This will probably ease the inconvenience for not calculating the NEIO 
indicators. Indeed, although the market structure indicators are not necessarily the best proxies of the market power and 
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there are both theoretical reasons and empirical evidence of the weak link between market structure and competition, 
we follow the SCP approach due to the fact that market concentration indicators calculated through NEIO would be 
highly correlated with stochastic approach applied in order to measure the impact of bank market concentration on 
inefficiency of financial stability. 
As we are interested in studying the impact of non-linearity of bank market concentration upon inefficiency of 
financial stability, we build a bank specific market share based on loans (MSL), which is the main activity of financial 
institutions (measured at local market - SLL - Sistemi Locali del Lavoro - being a sort of municipality context), as 
follows: 
𝑀𝑆! = !"#$%!(!"#$% !"#$%)!  	 (1)	
where (Total Loans)k refers to total bank loans grouped at market level 𝑘 (in our case local context associated to SLL) 
because it is reasonable that banks compete with other intermediaries operating in the surrounding areas as indeed 
might be the municipality. For robustness checks: (a) different financial activities, such as deposits (𝑀𝑆! = 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠!/(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠)!) and total assets (𝑀𝑆! = 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠!/(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)!), are also taken into account in order to capture how 
different bank activities influence our analysis and (b) different relevant markets, such as regional and provincial levels, 
are taken into account in order to calculate the concentration indicator. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
 
Testing the U-shaped between market concentration and financial stability 
 
By using the technique suggested by Lind and Mehlum (2010), we test the existence of the inverted U-shaped1 
between bank concentration and financial stability. More specifically, we present the test considering both the entire 
sample of banks and different sub-groups of financial institutions, such as cooperative (CB’s) and non-cooperative 
banks (NO-CB’s). Moreover, we check whether a shock, such as financial crisis, influences the shape of this function. 
The data validates the existence of the U-shaped between bank concentration and financial stability (i.e. we do not 
reject the H0: Monotone or U shaped); this test underlines the importance and necessity to take into account the non-
linear component when the concentration-stability nexus is investigated. As a consequence of the test, we use both the 
measure of bank concentration and its square to analyse the relationship between bank concentration and inefficiency of 
financial stability by employing a recent stochastic frontier technique suggested by Kumbhakar et al. (2014), including 
in the regression other determinants of financial stability, such as capitalization, bank size and credit insolvency.  
 
 
Financial stability and bank market concentration: a stochastic frontier approach 
We estimate the impact of bank concentration on inefficiency of financial stability using a parametric 
technique (see Tabak et al. 2012) by applying the recent model suggested by Kumbhakar et al. (2014) which splits the 
error term into four components: bank fixed effects, time-varying inefficiency, time-invariant inefficiency, and a 
stochastic component capturing random shocks. This model captures the fact that banks may eliminate certain sources 																																																								
1 Lind and Mehlum (2010) tests for the following hypotheses: H1: Inverse U shape; H0: Monotone or U shape. 
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of their short-run inefficiency over time, while other sources may have a more permanent nature. The model is 
represented by the following set of equations: 
 
 𝑦!" = 𝑓!" 𝑥!" ,  β!" + 𝜀!"   		 (2a)	𝜀!" = 𝑣!" − 𝑢!" + 𝛼! + 𝐸 𝑢!" + 𝛼!∗    (2b)	𝛼! = 𝜇! − 𝜂! + 𝐸(𝜂!)    (2c)	𝛼!∗ = 𝛼! − 𝐸 𝜂! − 𝐸(𝑢!")    (2d)	𝑣!" ~ 𝑖. 𝑖.𝑑.𝑁(0,𝜎!!)    (2e)	𝑢!" ~ 𝑖. 𝑖.𝑑.𝑁!(z!δ,𝜎!!)    (2f)	𝜇!  ~ 𝑖. 𝑖.𝑑.𝑁(0,𝜎!!)    (2g)	𝜂!  ~ 𝑖. 𝑖.𝑑.𝑁!(0,𝜎!!)    (2h)	
 
where y denotes the output of the i!" bank (in this case the financial stability indicator, i.e. z-score), xi represents 1xk 
vector of input, β is kx1 vector of unknown parameters to be estimate, 𝜂! represents persistent inefficiency, 𝑢!" denotes 
the short-run inefficiency distributed by each unit as truncation at zero, where z is a (1 x m) vector of exogenous factors 
associated with technical inefficiency of production of units and δ is a (m x 1) vector of unknown coefficients, 𝜇! 
captures bank effects and 𝑣!" is a stochastic component. 
This model is estimated in three steps. Firstly, equation (2a) is estimated using a standard fixed effects estimation. 
Secondly, time-varying inefficiency 𝑢!" is obtained. Lastly, persistent inefficiency 𝜂! is estimated (Kumbhakar et al., 
2014). More specifically, the translog specification is described as follows:  
 
!"!!. = 𝛽!  𝑦!. + 𝛾!( !!.!!. ) + 𝜏!𝑇 + !! 𝛽!" 𝑦!. 𝑦!.!! + 𝛾!"( !!.!!. ) ∗ ( !!.!!. ) + 𝜏!!𝑇!!! + 𝛿!" 𝑦! (!!.!!.)!!!!   		 (3)	
 
where 𝐹𝑆 is the natural logarithm of financial stability calculated using the z-score2, 𝑦 are (the natural logs of) output 
quantities, 𝑤 are (the natural logs of) input prices, and T denotes a time trend that captures changes in technology over 
time. The linear homogeneity in factor prices is guaranteed dividing all input prices and total cost by one input price (in 
our case labor cost, i.e. 𝑤!). Moreover, the symmetry conditions are also imposed, i.e. 𝛽!" = 𝛽!" and 𝛾!" =  𝛾!".  
Since they are mathematically equivalent, the choice of the normalizing variable is innocuous (Restrepo-Tobon and 
Kumbhakar, 2013, p. 16). The set of parameters in the translog function are estimated using maximum likelihood 
																																																								
2 As suggested by Roy (1952), the indicator of financial stability corresponds to the inverse of the probability of default and it’s considered in 
literature as one of the main indicators to quantify the financial stability in the banking sector. In other words, it measures the probability of default 
for a bank or a banking system. This indicator suffers from several limitations (Cihák et al., 2012). Its use is directly correlated to the probability of 
failure of a bank, occuring when the capital is less than debt. The formulation of z-score is: 𝑧 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = !"#!!"#!!"# , where ETA is the level of 
capitalisation of the bank (i.e. Equity to Total Assets), ROA denotes the ratio between profit and total assets (i.e. Return on Assets) and finally 𝜎!"# is 
the standard deviation of the ROA in the period analysed. It combines banks’ buffers (capital and profits) with the risks they face (measured by the 
standard deviation of returns). The z-score measures the number of standard deviations a return realization has to fall in order to deplete equity. A 
higher Z-score implies a lower probability of insolvency, providing a direct measure of stability that is superior to analyzing leverage. Because its 
skewness, we use a logit transformation of the z-score. Obviously, the standard deviation of ROA is calculated for both cooperative and non-
cooperative banks changing over time. Moreover, following the bacon algorithm proposed by Billor et al. (2000), we reduce the influence of outliers, 
eliminating them in the 0.01 percentile (see also Weber, 2010; Anginer et al. 2014; and Chiaramonte et al. 2015 for an application). 
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estimator (MLE) that allows us to get a consistent and efficient estimator as suggested by Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000). 
As suggested by the recent literature (see Tabak et al. 2012), we include some determinants both in the frontier and 
inefficiency component. More specifically, we include in the production function the following variables: 1) the value 
added divided by workers (VAC) in order to control for growth effect, 2) branches density measured as ratio between 
number of branches and square kilometer (BD) measured at SLL aggregate territorial level,	 in order to control for the 
geographical location of branches and as a measure of bank’s branch network in a market, 3) population density 
measured as ratio between total population and square kilometre (PD) in order to control for the relationship between 
high-low population density environments and financial inclusion and for the possible association with higher deposit 
depth and lower credit depth (i.e. banks operating in a region with a high population density may have lower expenses) 
and finally 4) deposits density measured as ratio between number of deposits and square kilometre (DD) as a proxy for 
the use of banking services. In order to construct BD and DD, we consider SLL-level data for branches and deposits 
taken from the Bank of Italy dataset (Bollettino Statistico), while the information on the population and surface or 
territorial kilometres are taken from ISTAT dataset. 
Furthermore, in the inefficiency component, we control for 1) a competition indicator (MS), 2) banking size 
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (TA), 3) bank capitalization measured by the ratio between equity and 
total assets (ETA), 4) credit risk measured by the ratio between non performing loans and total loans (NPLL) taken in 
logit transformation (i.e. lNPLL=NPLL/(100-NPLL)), and 5) typology of banks such as cooperative and commercial 
banks while popular is used as benchmark group (CB, COM and PB). Finally, a time trend is also included. We reduce 
the heterogeneity in our estimation because our analysis is based on a single country, accounting on cultural, 
geographical, political and monetary homogeneity. Moreover, the highly detailed spatial stratification enables us to 
capture the differences between geographical areas, obtaining more accurate estimates. 
 
 
IV. DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
Data 
 
Data have been collected from BilBank 2000 database distributed by ABI (Associazione Bancaria Italiana) 
because its large time extension and its rich set of information on bank balance sheets over the 2001-2012 period (see 
Table 2 for more details on the definition of the variables)3. We focus on the Italian context being a promising field of 
analysis, especially in the European landscape, due to the territorially highly disaggregated data availability, the 
financial reforms (privatization and Second Banking Directive) occurred after 1990 and the integration of markets. 
The sample of banks consists on cooperative, commercial and popular banks4, a less than other branches of banks 
located abroad. In particular, we use a sample of Italian banks classified by the Bank of Italy as: major (average funds 
intermediated more than 65 billion euro), large (average funds intermediated between 27 and 65 billion euro), medium 
(average funds intermediated between 9 and 27 billion euro), small (average funds intermediated between 1.3 and 9 
billion euro) and minor (average funds intermediated less than 1.3 billion euro). In this way, we also take into 
consideration the different size of financial institutions. 																																																								3	Unfortunately, we do not have information on some of the variables used in the analysis for years before 2001 and after 2012. For this reason, we 
base our analysis on the 2001-2012 time span. Furthermore, the ABI-dataset is compared with Bankscope-dataset. The debate is in favour of the first 
because it has some valuable information, such as number of branches and number of workers, necessary to evaluate the input prices for each bank.	
4 The “local” feature of Italian banking market is captured especially considering the cooperative banks (CB’s) that operate purely at the local level 
than other financial institutions. This allows them to take advantage of the close relationship with customers (banking relationship), thus having more 
information on the degree of insolvency. 	
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Table 3 describes the sample used in the analysis by geographical location, emphasizing the importance of the 
cooperative banks in the Italian banking scene; indeed, almost 66% of financial institution in our sample is made of 
cooperative banks, making them very important players and actors in the Italian financial environment. 
 
[Tables 2 and 3 around here] 
 
Variables 
According to the calculation of the bank performance, our production set follows the asset model (Sealey and 
Lindley, 1997), where the output vector (y) is composed by: customer loans (y1), services (administrative) or non – 
traditional activities (y2), i.e. commission income and other operating income, and securities (y3), i.e. bank loans, 
Treasury bills and similar securities, bonds and other debt less bonds and debt securities held by banks and other 
financial institutions. Since non-traditional activities play an important role in the banking output, we include a proxy to 
capture the effect of these activities, as the commission income and other operating income, on bank performance (e.g. 
Casu et al., 2004; Tortosa - Ausina et al., 2008). Instead, the inputs vector (x) consists of the following items: number of 
workers (x1), number of branches (x2) and fundraising (x3), i.e. total liabilities to customers, amounts owed to banks and 
debt securities (bonds, certificates of deposit and other securities). The cost vector (w) incurred by the credit institutions 
is composed by: labour cost (w1) obtained as the ratio of personnel expenses (wages and salaries, social charges, 
indemnities working, treatment pensions and similar) and number of employees; cost of physical capital (w2), i.e. ratio 
of other administrative expenses, value adjustments to tangible and intangible assets and other operating expenses to 
number of branches and cost of financial capital (w3), consisting of interest expenses and similar charges and 
commission expenses over total liabilities (see Table 4 for more details on descriptive statistics on input, input prices 
and output). On the output side, NO-CB’s have a lower value of customer loans (y1) as well as of the level of services 
(y2) and of other loans (y3). Considering the geographic location, banks located in the Northern regions have a high 
level of customer loans (y1), of services (y2) and of other loans (y3). The cost of labour (w1), of the physical (w2) and 
financial (w3) is higher for NO-CB’s as well as for banks operating in the Northern regions. NO-CB’s have a higher 
number of workers (x1), branches (x2) and a higher level of fundraising (x3). 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
The inclusion of some environmental variables in one stage stochastic frontier is strongly approved in the 
recent literature (Lozano-Vivas et al., (2002) and Hasan et al., (2009)), especially considering the Italian context 
(Destefanis et al., (2014) and Barra et al. (2016)). Therefore, in order to explore the role played by the institutional 
environment associated to the financial characteristics of banks on financial stability, we control for banking size 
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (TA), by the level of capitalization measured by equity to total assets 
(ETA), by a proxy of credit insolvency measured by non performing loans to total loans taken in logit transformation 
(lnNPLL) and by the typology of financial institutions (cooperative and commercial banks; popular used as benchmark 
group). Finally, a time trend is also included in order to account for inefficiency change. We rely on a highly 
disaggregated spatial stratification than enables us to capture the differences between geographical areas, obtaining 
more accurate estimates and avoiding part of distortion in the estimation. Specifically VAC, BD, PD and DD are not 
measured at the national or regional level as in previous studies, but at the local level (SLL). For comparison check, 
notice that there are nowadays in Italy 110 province (the NUTS3 category) while 686 SLLs have been identified by the 
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Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT, 2005) highlighting remarkable differences in economic performance across the Italian 
territory. SLL-level data for branches, deposits and loans are taken from the Bank of Italy dataset (Bollettino Statistico). 
The other variables useful for our analysis are drawn from BilBank 2000 database distributed by ABI (Associazione 
Bancaria Italiana). All monetary aggregates are in thousands of deflated 2005 euros. Our sample begins in 2001, 
because SLL-level data are not available before that year. The test and SFA regressions are carried out with STATA 
13.1, respectively. 
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
CB’s are more stable (FS=27.5) and more capitalized (ETA=0.13) than the NO-CB’s (FS=9.2, ETA=0.127). 
According to the competition indicator calculated at local level (i.e. SLL), Northern regions are less concentrated (NE: 
MSL=0.355 and NW: MSL=0.34) than Southern regions (Centre: MSL=0.49 and South: MSL=0.62). These differences 
persist when different levels of market structure are taken into account, even if the percentage of market share decreases 
because the border that characterized the market is bigger (see Table 1). More specifically, when the provincial level 
has been taken into account, the market concentration is: 0.156 (NE), 0.106 (NW), 0.17 (Centre) and 0.208 (South); 
when, instead, the regional level of market has been considered the market concentration is: 0.028 (NE), 0.025 (NW), 
0.033 (Centre) and 0.042 (South). Summing up, the concentration indicator for different levels of market structures (i.e. 
municipality, province and region) and when loan is taken as main financial activity is: NE (0.35, 0.156, 0.028); NW 
(0.34, 0.106, 0.025); Centre (0.49, 0.17, 0.33); South (0.49, 0.208, 0.042). 
With regard to the controls included both in the production frontier and inefficiency component (see Table 5 above), we 
notice that the Northern regions arise higher level of growth (VAC), higher density of deposits (DD) and lower 
percentage of credit risk (NPLL) with respect to Southern regions. Moreover, CB’s are more capitalized (ETA), but 
holds less quantity of assets having a lower size (TA) with respect to NO-CB’s. In order to have more information on 
the association between variables used into our analysis, their correlation coefficients are shown in Table 6 below. 
Boxplots of the financial stability indicator and of market concentration are, instead, shown in Figure 1. 
 
[Table 6 and Figure 1 around here] 
 
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Testing the non-linearity between bank concentration and risk-taking  
 
Firstly, by using the technique suggested by Lind and Mehlum (2010), we test the existence of the inverted U-
shaped between bank concentration (i.e. MSLOANS,SLL) and risk-taking (i.e. z-score), also including time dummies in 
order to control for the unobservable exogenous effects or any possible shocks presented in the period considered. Table 
7a shows the results when the level of concentration associated to bank specific loans has been considered as 
benchmark; considering the whole sample (Table 7a, Column a), the empirical evidence is in favour of an inverted U-
shaped relationship between the market share index and financial stability (we reject the H0: Monotone or U shape), 
suggesting that the increase in concentration does not have a linear effect on financial stability. Indeed, the test shows a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between market share and financial stability while, instead, a negative 
and statistically significant relationship between the squared market share and financial stability has been found. In 
other words, at low values of concentration, having more maket power (i.e. increasing the level of concentration in the 
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market) increases financial stability – i.e. banks are less fragile and the market is more stable; at some point, the effect 
becomes negative and the quadratic shape means that financial stability with respect to the measure of market share is 
decreasing as concentration increases – i.e. banks are more fragile and the market is less stable. In other words, at 
already high level of concentration, making the market even more concentrated has detrimental effects on financial 
stability. In order to take this relationship into account, we use both the market share and the square of market share. 
 
 [Table 7a around here] 
 
In order to explore the possible effects of the crisis, we exclude from our initial sample (2001-2012) the  
financial recession period that took place in 2007 - i.e. taking out years from 2007 onwards (Table 7a, Column b); the  
financial crisis does not seem to affect the inverted U-shaped relationship between market concentration and financial 
stability. Moreover, because of the special regulations (i.e. devote at least 70% of annual net profit to legal reserve, pay 
a share of annual net profits to mutual funds for the promotion and development of cooperation in an amount equal to 
3%, devote the remaining share of profits to purposes of charity or mutual aid) cooperative banks cannot maximize 
profits by choosing an optimal combination of outputs and for this reason they cannot be properly compared with other 
banks profit-efficiency wise; therefore, we also check whether the different features of financial institutions may 
influence the above described relationship – i.e. by considering CB’s (Table 7a, Columns c and d) and NO-CB’s (Table 
7a, Columns e and f) separately. Interestingly, results show that the evidence of the inverted U-shaped relationship 
between market concentration and financial stability is confirmed only for CB’s, showing a monotonic relationship, 
instead, when only NO-CB’s are taken into account. In line with the findings provided by Barra and Zotti (2017), this 
result could be due to the fact that manager of CB’s behaves better (in terms of risks) operating in competitive markets 
than NO-CB’s for the following reasons: (i) hold high level of capital used as buffer to bear negative events; (ii) do not 
maximize the profit (no incentive to operate in concentrate markets); (iii) know the type of borrowers given that hold 
soft information being in strictly contact with the customers (territorial feature); (iv) do not subject to merger and 
acquisition processes over time with respect to NO CB’s. Overall, CB’s don’t need to operate in concentrated market 
since the risks are lower than NO-CB’s. 
Finally, we also check whether the relationship between market concentration and financial stability changes 
when other financial activities are taken into account – i.e. measuring the market share index focusing the attention on 
the level of market power measured in the deposit (Table 7b) and asset (Table 7c) market, and when a different level of 
disaggregation at which we measure the market share index is considered – i.e. measuring the market share index both 
at province (Table 7d) and regional (Table 7e) level. The main results are confirmed. 
 
 [Tables 7b-7e around here] 
 
Stability inefficiency: the role of market competition 
 
Following equation (3), where the z-score is used as dependent variable in order to capture the role of financial 
stability, Tables 8a-8e show the results regarding the relationship between market concentration and the inefficiency of 
financial stability, taking also into account the role played by the size of banks, the level of capitalization and credit 
insolvency. A negative coefficient means that the corresponding variable is inversely proportional to financial fragility. 
In other words, a negative coefficient means that the related variable appears to increase stability. On the other hand, 
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instead, a positive coefficient means that the related variable is directly proportional to fragility. 
The main results show that the inefficiency of financial stability is U-shaped relationship with respect to the 
measure of market concentration, showing a negative and statistically significant relationship between inefficiency and 
market share while, instead, a positive and statistically significant relationship between inefficiency of financial stability 
and (squared) market share has been found. In other words, the increase in concentration does not lead to a linear 
change in inefficiency of the financial stability. Indeed, at low values of concentration, increasing the market power 
lowers the inefficiency of the financial stability – i.e. banks are less fragile and the market is more stable. In other 
words, concentration has positive effects on financial stability, due to the fact that banks can use profits in order to 
implement their monitoring and screening processes; as a consequence, banks reduce risks and increase the stability of 
the market. At some point, the effect becomes positive and the quadratic shape means that the inefficiency of financial 
stability with respect to the measure of market share is increasing as concentration increases – i.e. banks are more 
fragile and the market is less stable. In other words, at already high level of concentration, making the market even 
more concentrated has detrimental effects on financial stability and this result can be due to the fact that banks do not 
use their profits to implement monitoring and screening processes; then bank would attract all the types of borrowers, 
where the “bad type” is associated to a high insolvency, decreasing the survival probability. In other words, the bad 
borrowers will have more incentive to take more risks investing in riskier projects in order to repay the loan and the 
high interest rates imposed by banks operating in concentrated markets. Then concentration becomes risky, increasing 
the instability in the financial markets. The U-shaped relationship between market concentration and the inefficiency of 
financial stability also means that banks operating under low and high concentration levels are more fragile (i.e. higher 
inefficiency) than those operating under average concentration levels. 
To sum up, the empirical evidence seems to support both the “concentration-fragility” view (according to 
which a high market power is detrimental to the stability of the market system (Beck et al. 2006; Shaeck et al. 2009; Liu 
et al. 2012; Fiordelisi et al. 2014) at already high level of concentration and the “concentration-stability” view, as at low 
values of market concentration new entry decrease the probability of failure (Keeley, 1990; Allen and Gale, 2000; 2004; 
Beck et al. 2006; Matsuoka, 2013).  
[Table 8a around here] 
 
Stability inefficiency: the role of bank size, capitalization and credit insolvency 
 
Regarding the determinants associated to the institutional environment and to their effects on financial 
stability, the empirical evidence shows that the level of capitalization (ETA) is negatively and statistically significant, 
meaning that the higher is the level of capitalization of financial intermediares, the higher is the financial stability of the 
system. In other words, the level of capitalization produces a positive effect on stability, increasing survival probability 
of banks (Repullo, 2004). Indeed, the capital can be used as buffer in order to avoid the incidence of negative shocks, 
such as financial crises, on the survival probability of financial institutions. This suggests that the level of capitalization 
is an important tool in order to make financial intermediares less vulnerable to negative events. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that higher capitalization contributes to alleviate agency problems between managers and 
shareholders (Mester, 1996), reducing problem loans. Bank size (TA) is also negative and statistically significant 
meaning that larger banks are engaged in less risk-taking than smaller banks making increasing the efficiency of the 
financial system as a higher size allows financial institutions to have more resources allocated in order to cover the 
risks. The credit insolvency (NPLL) variable is, instead, positive and statistically significant meaning that the 
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deterioration in asset quality is found to negatively affect the stability of the financial system. This result is consistent 
with the notion that after loans become non-performing after being in default, operating costs rise because of the 
difficulty in dealing with these loans, increasing financial fragility. Finally, the dummy variable for cooperative banks 
(CB’s) is negative and highly statistically significant, meaning that cooperative banks contribute more to improve the 
efficiency of financial stability with respect to non-cooperative banks. In other words, the cooperative banks are more 
stable and resilience to negative events (for instance financial crisis) than non-cooperative banks. 
We then interact bank size, credit insolvency and capitalization with the measure of market share. Results are 
presented in Table 8a, Columns B, C, D and E (again the level of concentration associated to bank specific loans has 
been considered as benchmark). The interaction between market share and the level of capitalization (Table 8a, Column 
B) is not statistically significant suggesting that high, low and average competition levels do not change the positive 
effects that the level of capitalization has on the stability inefficiency.  Coefficients of the interaction between size and 
the market share variable as well as between size and the squared term of the market share variable show that the effect 
of size on financial stability is an inverse U-shaped as a function of the market share indicator (Table 8a, Column C). At 
low value of concentration, increasing bank size has a positive effect on the inefficiency of stability – i.e. banks are 
more fragile and the market is less stable. At some point, the effect becomes negative and the quadratic shape means 
that the inefficiency of financial stability with respect to the interaction between size of banks and market share is 
decreasing as concentration increases – i.e. banks are less fragile and the market is more stable. This result is in favour 
of the “concentration-stability” view according to which larger banks in more concentrated markets (i.e. more collusive 
markets) are more stable. Regarding the interaction between credit insolvency and market share (Table 8a, Column D), 
results show that the inefficiency of financial stability is U-shaped relationship with respect to the interaction of market 
share and credit insolvency, showing a negative and statistically significant relationship between inefficiency and the 
interaction term between market share and credit insolvency. 
 
VI. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  
 
The main results are obtained when the level of concentration is measured in the loan market at SLL level – i.e. 
the market share corresponds to the ratio of bank specific loans to total loans. The first robustness check consists in 
repeating the empirical analysis focusing the attention on the level of market power measured in the deposit and asset 
market. More specifically, Table 8b shows the results when the market share index corresponds to the ratio of bank 
specific deposit to total deposits at SLL level, while Table 8c shows the results when the market share index 
corresponds to the ratio of banks specific assets to total assets at SLL level. In both cases the main results are 
confirmed. The empirical evidence shows the U-shaped relationship between the inefficiency of financial stability and 
the measure of market concentration, confirming that the increase in concentration does not lead to a linear change in 
inefficiency of financial stability. The level of capitalization (ETA) is still negatively and statistically significant, 
having the level of capitalization positive effects on stability of the bank system. Bank size (TA) is also confirmed to be 
inversely proportional to financial fragility, therefore increasing stability. The deterioration in asset quality (NPLL) is 
again directly proportional to fragility (see Table 8b, Column A1; Table 8c, Column A2). When the interaction between 
bank size, credit insolvency and capitalization with the measure of market share is taken into account (Table 8b, 
Columns B1-E1; Table 8c, Columns B2-E2), results confirm that the effect of size on the inefficiency of stability is an 
inverse U-shaped as a function of the market share indicator; in other words, the interaction between bank size and 
market share is decreasing as concentration increases making banks less fragile and the market more stable.  
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As a further robustness check, we also explore whether the level of disaggregation at which we measure the 
market share index may affect the results. More specifically, in the main analysis, we measure the market share index as 
the ratio between bank specific loan (deposit or asset) to total bank loans (deposit or asset) grouped at SLL level (i.e. 
municipality level). In other words, the relevant market has SLL disaggregation. For robustness, we repeat the analysis 
measuring the market share index both at province (Table 8d, Columns A3-E3) and regional (Table 8e, Columns A4-
E4) level. In other words, we assume that banks compete with other intermediaries operating in the same province 
(PROV) and region (REG)5. Table 8d shows the results when the market share index is measured as the ratio between 
bank specific loan to total bank loans grouped at province level, while Table 8e shows the results when the market share 
index is measured as the ration between banks loans to total bank loans grouped at regional level. Due to space 
constraints, we only show the results when the level of concentration is measured in the loan market (results when using 
the level of concentration in both deposit and asset marker are similar and available on request). In all cases the main 
results are generally confirmed. 
[Tables 8b-8e around here] 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
 The main aim of the paper is to explore the relationship between market concentration and financial stability of the 
banking system. We firstly test the existence of a U-shaped relationship between market concentration and financial 
stability; secondly, we regress the market share indicator on bank risk-taking to underline whether financial stability is 
affected by increasing or decreasing the market share of banks. Thirdly, we explore whether this relationship is affected 
by the size, level of capitalization and credit insolvency of banks. 
 The empirical evidence is in favour of an inverted U-shaped relationship between the market share index and 
financial stability only for cooperative banks, while a monotonic relationship, instead, has been found when non-
cooperative banks have been considered. This result suggests that cooperative banks operating in less concentrated 
markets might have overall low risk measures; in other words, it seems that cooperative banks behave better (in term of 
risks) in less concentrated markets. Indeed, cooperative banks hold a high level of capitalization and, due to their 
mission, do not maximise profits; in other words, their managers have less incentive to operate in concentrated markets. 
This evidence could be very relevant in term of policy implications when considering the reform of the cooperative 
banks that took place in Italy from 2016 onwards, aiming at eliminating structural weaknesses in the cooperative 
banking system. Cooperative banks have been confirmed as important institutions serving local communities; however, 
it has been asked to each cooperative bank to either join a cooperative banking group or become a commercial bank. 
More specifically, each cooperative bank is required to join a cooperative banking group as a condition to being 
authorised by the Bank of Italy to carry out banking businesses; otherwise, for a cooperative bank in order to remain 
independent from a cooperative banking group, it must be transformed into a commercial bank or transfer its assets to 
one or more mutual funds for the promotion and development of cooperation. Any cooperative bank which does not 
either join a cooperative banking group or transform into a commercial bank must be liquidated or wound-up. In other 
words a call for a more concentrated banking system has been clearly made for the Italian credit system by the Italian 
government. The reform aimed to reduce the fragmentation of the banking sector, leading to transformations and 																																																								5	In order to provide the reader with more information on the level of disaggregation used in the analysis, in Italy there are 110 province (the NUTS3 
category) and 20 regions (the NUTS2 category) while 686 SLLs have been identified by the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT, 2005). 
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merging operations that are not supported by our data which, instead, suggest less incentives for cooperative banks to 
concentrate in order to better perform in term of risks. For a discussion on the benefits and costs of competition and 
cooperation among cooperative banks see also Coccorese and Ferri (2017) who underline that competition might be 
helpful in order to expel the least efficient bank from the market even though cooperation might also work in order to 
improve network economies and relationships between banks. 
 The empirical evidence also shows that inefficiency of financial stability is U-shaped relationship with respect to the 
measure of market concentration. Indeed, at low values of market concentration, increasing market power decreases the 
inefficiency of stability (i.e. the system is more stable). However, as the concentration level of the market increases, 
then more concentration leads to less stability of the market. Results support the “concentration” fragility view 
according to which a more collusive banking market increases financial fragility, when market level concentration is 
already relatively high. Indeed, bank market power in the deposit market induces banks to increase the cost of 
borrowing for entrepreneurs; their default risk will increase as a consequence of the fact that entrepreneurs are hindered 
to undertake more risky projects. The higher default risk of entrepreneurs shifts on the financial institutions and 
weakens bank financial security (Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005). On the other hand, results support also the 
“concentration-stability” point of view according to which systemic banking crises are less likely to occur when the 
banking system is more concentrated (Beck et al. 2006) when, instead, the market level concentration is already 
relatively low. Confirming the evidence produced by Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), we find that the “margin” 
effect dominate in already competitive markets (i.e higher competition increases the fragility of the market) while in 
very concentrated markets is the “risk shifting” effect to dominate (i.e. higher competition reduces the fragility of the 
market). Finally, when taking into account the role of capitalisation, size and credit insolvency on the relationship 
between bank concentration and risk-taking, results show that bank size is the most influential variable on this 
relationship as we find that the effect of size on financial stability is an inverse U-shaped as a function of the market 
share indicator. At low value of concentration, increasing bank size has a positive effect on the inefficiency of stability – 
i.e. banks are more fragile and the market is less stable; at some point, the effect becomes negative meaning that the 
inefficiency of financial stability with respect to the interaction between size of banks and market share is decreasing as 
concentration increases – i.e. banks are less fragile and the market is more stable. 
 Our evidence can help policy makers and regulators taking decisions in order to reduce the instability of the financial 
market. Indeed, after a certain level of concentration, banks do not have incentive to get more market power as risk-
taking and the inefficiency of financial stability will be higher (i.e. the bank will have to cover all the risks in highly 
concentrated markets). This leads policy makers and regulators to avoid the creation of concentrated market or 
monopoly that increase the instability. In particular, according to the theoretical prediction of Boyd and De Nicolò 
(2005), in concentrated markets financial institutions impose higher interest rates. This choice attracts borrowers more 
risky given that must invest in risky projects in order to repay the loan and the higher interest rates, increasing the 
instability of financial stability. In fact, banks have to bear a high share of risk that increases the probability of 
bankruptcy.   
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TABLES AND FIGURES 				
Table 1: Market structure and financial stability 
          
YEAR MSL,SLL MSL,PROV MSL,REG FS 
2001 0.4269 0.1433 0.0146 10.0639 
2002 0.4298 0.1448 0.0132 11.5686 
2003 0.4455 0.1580 0.0135 18.6420 
2004 0.4279 0.1502 0.0127 20.9332 
2005 0.4531 0.1586 0.0125 20.9718 
2006 0.4453 0.1585 0.0137 24.1359 
2007 0.4419 0.1468 0.0140 19.9695 
2008 0.4417 0.1524 0.0144 27.0190 
2009 0.4395 0.1485 0.0187 30.0540 
2010 0.4540 0.1599 0.0217 32.5623 
2011 0.4600 0.1583 0.0264 22.2012 
2012 0.4627 0.1732 0.0330 18.3441 
     
GEO 
    
     South 0.6237 0.2087 0.0425 23.4498 
 
[0.3998] [0.2988] [0.1178] [14.4576] 
     Centre 0.4911 0.1698 0.0332 18.6142 
 
[0.4167] [0.2678] [0.1010] [12.2785] 
     N-W 0.3444 0.1061 0.0249 24.1766 
 
[0.3475] [0.2166] [0.0872] [14.2422] 
     N-E 0.3556 0.1564 0.0283 16.3582 
 
[0.3896] [0.2621] [0.1064] [12.9590] 
     Italy 0.4433 0.1538 0.0316 21.2668 
 
[0.4003] [0.2608] [0.1023] [14.0351] 
     CB's 0.4285 0.0829 0.0077 27.4552 
 
[0.3959] [0.1776] [0.0426] [12.0217] 
     NO CB's 0.4721 0.2921 0.0781 9.2000 
  [0.4072] [0.3320] [0.1552] [8.8888] 
Notes: our elaboration. Standard deviation in brackets. 	 			
Table 2: Description of the variables 
 
Variables Symbol Description 
   
Concentration and Financial Stability   
   
Market share index (SLL) MSL,SLL Market share index based on bank specific loans to total loans at SLL level. a 
Market share index (PROV) MSL,PROV Market share index based on bank specific loans to total loans at provincial level. a 
Market share index (REG) MSL,,REG Market share index based on bank specific loans to total loans at regional level. a 
Financial Stability FS Capitalisation plus return on assets over standard deviation of return on assets.a 
 
Determinants of inefficiency 
  
   
Size of banks TA Log of total assets.a 
Capitalisation ETA Equity to total assets.a 
Credit risk NPLL Non performing loans to total loans.a 
Type of banks TYPE Cooperative and commercial banks dummies; popular used as benchmark group 
 
Controls in the frontier 
 
  
Branch density BD Number of branches per square kilometre. b,d 
Population density PD Number of inhabitant per square kilometre. b,d 
Deposit density DD Number of deposits per square kilometre. b,d 
National income VAC Value added per workers. c,d 
Notes: our elaboration. 
Source: (a) own calculations upon BilBank 2000 database from ABI; (b) ISTAT (2005); (c) ISTAT (2005) and own calculations from Bureau Van Dijck’s 
AIDA; (d) Bank of Italy (Bollettino Statistico). 
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Table 3: Description of Sample used in the Analysis (2001-2012 period) 
 
South Centre N-W N-E Total 
CB's 1316 939 2048 732 5035 
NO-CB's 489 615 642 851 2597 
ITALY 1805 1554 2690 1583 7632 
Notes: own elaboration 	
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for the inputs, inputs prices and outputs used in the Production Function 
 
(y1) (y2) (y3) (x1) (x2) (x3) (w1) (w2) (w3) 
South 
         
 
1000752 565399.4 22933.77 36.70 349 1367943 628 60.33 0.0195 
 
[9714297] [5851982] [188299.2] [210.75] [2.585] [1.21e+07] [3.171] [15.77] [0.0193] 
Centre 
         
 
2645613 1032045 67815.09 641.47 790 3301393 2028.12 60.71 0.0239 
 
[1.18e+07] [4773043] [296051.6] [262.04] [3.488] [1.44e+07] [14920.71] [17.08] [0.0215] 
N-W 
         
 
1721164 555330.1 40599.75 56.35 546 2019419 756 60.57 0.0222 
 
[1.09e+07] [4990619] [246300.6] [283.60] [3.771] [1.33e+07] [4.316] [15.43] [0.0123] 
N-E 
         
 
4241102 2371109 126523 112.80 1283 5961578 3885 66.19 0.0292 
 
[1.89e+07] [1.14e+07] [505172.3] [446.30] [5.895] [2.55e+07] [1630.15] [23.97] [0.0403] 
Italy 
         
 
2264396 1035054 59976.01 65.24 704 2948960 1625 61.74 0.0234 
 
[1.30e+07] [7027130] [319877.1] [308.54] [4.056] [1.67e+07] [10539.01] [18.09] [0.0241] 
CB's 
         
 
203546 83731.98 3264.213 9.04 69 249918.9 375 60.09 0.0209 
 
[360719.8] [160671.1] [8366.673] [12.33] [165] [442801.1] [249] [14.41] [0.0109] 
NO CB's 
         
 
6282893 2890057 170559.6 174.82 1944 8211881 4061 64.95 0.0282 
 
[2.18e+07] [1.19e+07] [532234.7] [512.27] [6794.32] [2.79e+07] [17850.22 [23.34] [0.0380] 
Source: own calculations upon BilBank 2000 database from ABI (values on average). 
Notes: customer loans (y1), securities and other loans (y2), services or non-traditional activities (y3), number of branches (x1), number of workers (x2), 
fundraising (x3); cost of physical capital (w1), labour cost (w2), cost of financial capital (w3). All variables averaged between 2001 and 2012. All monetary 
aggregates are in thousands of Euros (at 2005 prices). Standard deviation in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Variables used in the Analysis 
 
  VAC BD DD PD ETA TA NPLL 
South 
       
 
0.0451 0.0766 0.0084 408.1684 0.1333 1946289 0.0250 
 
[0.0096] [0.0616] [0.0091] [687.8695] [0.0569] (1.97e+07] (0.0198] 
Centre 
       
 
0.0508 0.0729 0.0121 341.0445 0.1199 4350311 0.0176 
 
[0.0072] [0.0565] [0.0077] [335.2338] [0.0533] [1.95e+07] [0.0156] 
N-W 
       
 
0.0526 0.0904 0.0122 234.9837 0.1353 2779249 0.0137 
 
[0.0071] [0.0662] [0.0054] [219.6781] [0.0544] [2.08e+07] [0.0168] 
N-E 
       
 
0.0569 0.0580 0.0182 892.9089 0.1251 8144746 0.0132 
 
[0.0073] [0.0405] [0.0135] [849.1097] [0.0743] [3.73e+07] [0.0166] 
Italy 
       
 
0.0513 0.0769 0.0125 431.1484 0.1293 4019072 0.0170 
 
[0.0087] [0.0597] [0.0094] [596.9964] [0.0582] [2.48e+07] [0.0178] 
CB's 
       
 
// // // // 0.1304 338165.7 0.0184 
 
// // // // [0.0403] [628525.5] [0.0161] 
NO-CB's 
       
 
// // // // 0.1271 1.12e+07 0.0143 
  // // // // [0.0825] [4.18e+07] [0.0206] 
Notes: see Table 1 for more details about the description and construction of variables included in the regression. All variables averaged between 2001 and 
2012. All monetary aggregates are in thousands of Euros (at 2005 prices). Standard deviation in brackets. 
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Table 6: Correlation between variables (2001-2012), Whole sample 
                                    
  FS MSLOANS,SLL MS2LOANS,SLL MS2LOANS,PROV MS2LOANS,PROV MS2LOANS,REG MS2LOANS,REG VAC BD DD PD CB COM POP ETA TA NPLL 
                  
FS 1 
                
                  
MSLOANS,SLL 0.0085 1 
               
 
[0.4582] 
                
                  
MS2LOANS,SLL 0.0119 0.9756 1 
              
 
[0.2992] [0.0000] 
               
                  
MSLOANS,PROV -0.2052 0.5043 0.4827 1 
             
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
              
                  
MS2LOANS,PROV -0.1734 0.4408 0.4411 0.9572 1 
            
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
             
                  
MSLOANS,REG -0.2237 0.2201 0.1965 0.5096 0.4893 1 
           
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
            
                  
MS2LOANS,REG -0.1329 0.1633 0.1578 0.3805 0.3980 0.9193 1 
          
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
           
                  
VAC -0.0973 -0.4547 -0.4185 -0.0707 -0.0638 0.0267 0.0267  1 
         
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0198] [0.0199] 
          
                  
BD 0.1768 [0.2369 0.1910 -0.0720 -0.0646 -0.1088 -0.0762  -0.4549 1 
        
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000 
         
                  
DD -0.1948 -0.4149 -0.3548 -0.1153 -0.0907 0.0033 0.0060  0.6380 -0.4905 1 
       
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.7780] [0.6081] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
        
                  
PD -0.2143 -0.3218 -0.2651 -0.0563 -0.0385 0.0139 0.0260  0.4060 -0.4094 0.6763 1 
      
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0008] [0.2256] [0.0237] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
       
                  
CB 0.6188 -0.0517 -0.0547 -0.3802 -0.3256 -0.3257 -0.1860  -0.2594 0.3154 -0.3202 -0.3263 1 
     
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
      
                  COM -0.6604 -0.0268 -0.0192 0.2731 0.2360 0.2756 0.1580  0.2607 -0.2930 0.3371 0.3240 -0.8807 1 
    
 
[0.0000] [0.0195] [0.0953] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
     
                  
POP 0.0225 0.1612 0.1524 0.2502 0.2099 0.1314 0.0737  0.0225 -0.0738 -0.0040 0.0364 -0.3346 -0.1516 1 
   
 
[0.0502] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0500] [0.0000] [0.7290] [0.0015] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
    
                  
ETA 0.3296 -0.0832 -0.0570 -0.1051 -0.0765 -0.1123 -0.0681  -0.0620 0.0607 -0.0480 0.0487 0.0266 -0.0225 -0.0109  1 
  
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000 [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0203] [0.0502] [0.3437] 
   
                  
TA -0.1389 0.0720 0.0539 0.2477 0.2296 0.4649 0.4196  0.0898 -0.0947 0.1497 0.1087 -0.2069 0.1811 0.0716  -0.0567 1 
 
 
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
  
                  
NPLL 0.0850 0.1036 0.1030 0.0309 0.0288 0.0095 0.0165  -0.1349 -0.0129 -0.0726 -0.0827 0.1056 -0.1339 0.0461  -0.0834 -0.0056 1 
  [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0070] [0.0120] [0.4063] [0.1502] [0.0000] [0.2672] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.6264]   
Notes: own elaboration; p-value in brackets; 
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Table 7a. Testing inverted U-shaped of financial stability and market concentration (SLL as relevant market) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 ALL BANKS ALL BANKS ONLY CB’s ONLY CB’s ONLY NO CB’s ONLY NO CB’s 
 ALL PERIOD PRE CRISIS ALL PERIOD PRE CRISIS ALL PERIOD PRE CRISIS 
              
MSLOANS, SLL 3.714*** 5.176*** 4.384*** 6.406*** 0.516*** 0.921*** 
 [0.110] [0.148] [0.116] [0.175] [0.155] [0.198] 
       
MS2LOANS,SLL -3.049*** -4.271*** -3.613*** -5.298*** -0.000583 -0.356 
 [0.109] [0.150] [0.115] [0.177] [0.154] [0.198] 
       
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Shaped Inverted U Inverted U Inverted U Inverted U Monotonic Monotonic 
Turning point 0.6089 0.6059 0.6067 0.6045 // // 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 // // 
t-value 21.06 21.18 24.01 22.37 // // 𝑙𝑛𝛼             
Constant -0.277*** -0.0736*** -0.671*** -0.166*** -0.848*** -0.886*** 
  [0.0178] [0.0223] [0.0261] [0.0283] [0.0343] [0.0473] 
N 7596 4567 5005 3063 2576 1504 
 
Notes: Lind and Mehlum (2010) tests for the following hypotheses: H1: Inverse U shape; H0: Monotone or U shape; Standard errors in brackets;; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001; 
 
 
Table 7b. Testing inverted U-shaped of financial stability and market concentration (SLL as relevant market) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 ALL BANKS ALL BANKS ONLY CB’s ONLY CB’s ONLY NO CB’s ONLY NO CB’s 
 ALL PERIOD PRE CRISIS ALL PERIOD PRE CRISIS ALL PERIOD PRE CRISIS 
       
MSDEPOSITS, SLL 3.930*** 5.362*** 4.507*** 6.493*** 0.622*** 1.007*** 
 [0.108] [0.145] [0.114] [0.168] [0.157] [0.198] 
       
MS2DEPOSITS,SLL -3.243*** -4.435*** -3.706*** -5.354*** -0.108 -0.448* 
 [0.107] [0.147] [0.112] [0.171] [0.156] [0.199] 
       
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Shaped Inverted U Inverted U Inverted U Inverted U Monotonic Monotonic 
Turning point 0.606 0.604 0.608 0.603 // // 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 // // 
t-value 23.03 22.65 25.27 23.35 // // 𝑙𝑛𝛼       
Constant -0.291*** -0.0972*** -0.689*** -0.199*** -0.847*** -0.885*** 
 [0.0178] [0.0223] [0.0260] [0.0283] [0.0342] [0.0473] 
N 7596 4570 5008 3066 2574 1504 
 
Notes: Lind and Mehlum (2010) tests for the following hypotheses: H1: Inverse U shape; H0: Monotone or U shape; Standard errors in brackets;; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001; 
 
 
 
 
Table 7c. Testing inverted U-shaped of financial stability and market concentration (SLL as relevant market) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 ALL BANKS ALL BANKS ONLY CB’s ONLY CB’s ONLY NO CB’s ONLY NO CB’s 
 ALL PERIOD PRE CRISIS ALL PERIOD PRE CRISIS ALL PERIOD  PRE CRISIS 
       
MSASSETS, SLL 3.805*** 5.267*** 4.487*** 6.472*** 0.429** 0.853*** 
 [0.109] [0.146] [0.115] [0.170] [0.156] [0.200] 
       
MS2ASSETS,SLL -3.126*** -4.348*** -3.698*** -5.347*** 0.0803 -0.295 
 [0.108] [0.148] [0.113] [0.173] [0.155] [0.200] 
       
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Shaped Inverted U Inverted U Inverted U Inverted U Monotonic Monotonic 
Turning point 0.608 0.606 0.607 0.605 // // 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 // // 
t-value 21.84 21.91 24.98 23.07 // // 𝑙𝑛𝛼       
Constant -0.280*** -0.0836*** -0.681*** -0.188*** -0.846*** -0.882*** 
 [0.0177] [0.0223] [0.0260] [0.0283] [0.0343] [0.0473] 
N 7596 4570 5008 3066 2574 1504 
 
Notes: Lind and Mehlum (2010) tests for the following hypotheses: H1: Inverse U shape; H0: Monotone or U shape; Standard errors in brackets;; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001; 
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Table 7d. Testing inverted U-shaped of financial stability and market concentration (PROV as relevant market) 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 ALL BANKS ALL BANKS ONLY CB’s ONLY CB’s ONLY NO CB’s ONLY NO CB’s 
 ALL PERIOD PRE CRISIS ALL PERIOD PRE CRISIS ALL PERIOD PRE CRISIS 
              
MSLOANS, PROV 1.883*** 4.221*** 4.644*** 9.068*** 1.115*** 1.158*** 
 [0.149] [0.227] [0.205] [0.382] [0.158] [0.205] 
       
MS2LOANS,PROV -2.287*** -4.599*** -4.635*** -9.139*** -0.867*** -0.913*** 
 [0.167] [0.257] [0.231] [0.422] [0.175] [0.229] 
       
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Shaped Inverted U Inverted U Inverted U Inverted U Inverted U Inverted U 
Turning point 0.4115 0.4588 0.5009 0.4961 0.6431 0.6336 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.006 
t-value 12.66 16.48 16.88 18.62 3.05 2.51 𝑙𝑛𝛼             
Constant -0.179*** 0.178*** -0.511*** 0.198*** -0.804*** -0.829*** 
  [0.0188] [0.0227] [0.0287] [0.0282] [0.0340] [0.0472] 
N 7599 4570 5008 3066 2576 1504 
 
Notes: Lind and Mehlum (2010) tests for the following hypotheses: H1: Inverse U shape; H0: Monotone or U shape; Standard errors in brackets;; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001; 
 
 
 
Table 7e. Testing inverted U-shaped of financial stability and market concentration (REG as relevant market) 
       
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 ALL BANKS ALL BANKS ONLY CB’s ONLY CB’s ONLY NO CB’s ONLY NO CB’s 
 ALL PERIOD PRE CRISIS ALL PERIOD PRE CRISIS ALL PERIOD PRE CRISIS 
              
MSLOANS, REG -3.580*** -0.891 18.92*** 75.69*** 0.0853 0.250 
 [0.287] [0.512] [1.790] [4.079] [0.248] [0.346] 
       
MS2LOANS,REG 3.217*** -0.134 -19.93*** -96.40*** -0.178 -0.697 
 [0.415] [0.766] [1.813] [5.144] [0.352] [0.518] 
       
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Shaped Inverted U Monotonic Inverted U Inverted U Inverted U Inverted U 
Turning point 0.5563 // 0.4747 0.3925 0.2391 0.1797 
p-value 0.00 // 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.23 
t-value 4.96 // 10.57 18.56 0.34 0.72 𝑙𝑛𝛼             
Constant -0.236*** 0.188*** -0.467*** 0.300*** -0.783*** -0.824*** 
  [0.0195] [0.0237] [0.0302] [0.0274] [0.0340] [0.0477] 
N 7599 4570 5008 3066 2576 1504 
 
Notes: Lind and Mehlum (2010) tests for the following hypotheses: H1: Inverse U shape; H0: Monotone or U shape; Standard errors in brackets;; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001; 
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Table 8a. SFA Regressions to estimate the relationship between financial stability, market concentration and other determinants 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Determinants of inefficiency of 
financial stability           
CB's -3.821** -3.745** -4.409* -3.855** -3.962* 
 
[1.438] [1.418] [1.806] [1.448] [1.637] 
      
NO CB's 1.313*** 1.309*** 1.676*** 1.274*** 1.592*** 
 [0.285] [0.293] [0.362] [0.282] [0.346] 
      
ln(TA) -0.0497* -0.0513* -0.0803** -0.0424* -0.0720** 
 [0.0212] [0.0223] [0.0270] [0.0210] [0.0256] 
      
ETA -0.831* -0.693* -0.905* -0.803* -0.816* 
 [0.366] [0.347] [0.400] [0.354] [0.377] 
      
lNPLL 0.0540*** 0.0536*** 0.0543*** 0.0605*** 0.0574*** 
 [0.0134] [0.0134] [0.0135] [0.0143] [0.0139] 
      
MSLOANS,SLL -4.235*** -3.033 -40.14*** -15.74** -48.34*** 
 [1.211] [1.769] [11.57] [5.424] [13.67] 
      
MS2LOANS,SLL 2.492** 2.012 41.47*** 15.25** 54.13*** 
 [0.784] [1.808] [12.05] [5.361] [14.98] 
      
MSLOANS,SLL*ETA  -11.53   13.58 
  [16.49]   [12.98] 
      
MS2LOANS,SLL*ETA  5.318   -25.90 
  [17.46]   [14.88] 
      
MSLOANS,SLL*lnTA   2.327***  2.217*** 
   [0.671]  [0.629] 
      
MS2LOANS,SLL*lnTA   -2.562***  -2.597*** 
   [0.746]  [0.740] 
      
MSLOANS,SLL*lnNPLL    -1.228* -0.928* 
    [0.484] [0.416] 
      
MS2LOANS,SLL*lnNPLL    1.384** 1.041* 
 
   [0.519] [0.446] 
      
Log	likelihood	 3617.8611 3621.612 3662.0035 3633.7525 3679.697 
Wald	 123102.97 122505.54 125654.18 121951.98 124217.37 
	      𝝈𝑼           
Constant -1.252*** -1.242*** -1.118*** -1.256*** -1.168*** 
 (-4.54) (-4.44) (-4.09) (-4.61) (-4.24) 𝝈𝑽           
Constant -4.356*** -4.362*** -4.349*** -4.351*** -4.352*** 
  (-93.90) (-93.88) (-91.39) (-93.71) (-93.26) 
N 7327 7327 7327 7327 7327 
Notes: Logit tranformation of FS: lnFS=ln(1+(FS/100));  Logit tranformation of NPLL: lNPLL=ln(1+(NPLL/100)); Standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p 
< 0.001 
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Table 8b. SFA Regressions to estimate the relationship between financial stability, market concentration and other determinants 
        (A1) (B1) (C1) (D1) (E1) 
Determinants of inefficiency of  
financial stability 
     CB's -3.779** -3.736** -3.994* -3.793** -3.705* 
 
[1.432] [1.425] [1.617] [1.454] [1.519] 
      NO CB's 1.334*** 1.313*** 1.600*** 1.327*** 1.578*** 
 
[0.286] [0.288] [0.339] [0.283] [0.330] 
      lnTA -0.0520* -0.0506* -0.0734** -0.0502* -0.0725** 
 
[0.0211] [0.0218] [0.0246] [0.0210] [0.0238] 
      ETA -0.821* -0.799* -0.844* -0.808* -0.910* 
 
[0.372] [0.370] [0.388] [0.369] [0.400] 
      lNPLL 0.0561*** 0.0556*** 0.0566*** 0.0570*** 0.0534*** 
 
[0.0139] [0.0139] [0.0141] [0.0150] [0.0145] 
      
MSDEPOSITS,SLL -4.340*** -4.799** -32.38** -7.080 -38.00** 
 
[1.193] [1.850] [10.02] [6.998] [12.49] 
      MS2DEPOSITS,SLL 2.551*** 3.696* 34.77*** 6.599 45.81*** 
 
[0.774] [1.774] [10.53] [6.968] [13.91] 
      MSDEPOSITS,SLL*ETA 
 
4.317 
  
33.16* 
  
[12.76] 
  
[15.55] 
      MS2DEPOSITS,SLL*ETA 
 
-10.12 
  
-46.51* 
  
[14.45] 
  
[18.33] 
      MSDEPOSITS,SLL*lnTA 
  
1.857** 
 
2.012** 
   
[0.587] 
 
[0.630] 
      MS2DEPOSITS,SLL*lnTA 
  
-2.166** 
 
-2.540*** 
   
[0.659] 
 
[0.756] 
      MSDEPOSITS,SLL*lnNPLL 
   
-0.300 0.0159 
    
[0.744] [0.679] 
      MS2DEPOSITS,SLL*lnNPLL 
   
0.460 0.0793 
    
[0.744] [0.675] 
      
Log	likelihood 3626.8218 3628.9841 3657.928 3633.2047 3673.95 
Wald 126464.79 125858.85 127041.90 123818.10 125072.37 
      𝝈𝑼 
     Constant -1.250*** -1.252*** -1.167*** -1.250*** -1.201*** 
 
[0.276] [0.277] [0.278] [0.277] [0.284] 𝝈𝑽 
     Constant -4.350*** -4.354*** -4.350*** -4.346*** -4.352*** 
  [0.0460] [0.0464] [0.0468] [0.0461] [0.0459] 
N 7325 7325 7325 7325 7325 
Notes: Logit tranformation of FS: lnFS=ln(1+(FS/100));  Logit tranformation of NPLL: lNPLL=ln(1+(NPLL/100)); Standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p 
< 0.001 
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Table 8c. SFA Regressions to estimate the relationship between financial stability, market concentration and other determinants 
  (A2) (B2) (C2) (D2) (E2) 
Determinants of inefficiency of 
financial stability           
CB's -3.659* -3.546* -4.389* -3.548** -3.908* 
 
[1.423] [1.401] [1.822] [1.357] [1.625] 
 
     
NO CB's 1.400*** 1.410*** 1.945*** 1.353*** 1.858*** 
 
[0.300] [0.312] [0.436] [0.290] [0.410] 
 
     
lnTA -0.0598** -0.0633** -0.105** -0.0501* -0.0947** 
 
[0.0225] [0.0242] [0.0334] [0.0218] [0.0310] 
 
     
ETA -0.823* -0.654 -0.922* -0.802* -0.885* 
 
[0.383] [0.361] [0.440] [0.371] [0.421] 
 
     
lNPLL 0.0571*** 0.0560*** 0.0578*** 0.0647*** 0.0614*** 
 
[0.0149] [0.0149] [0.0149] [0.0163] [0.0155] 
      
MSASSETS,SLL -3.234*** -1.883 -42.24*** -9.976 -46.56*** 
 
[0.924] [1.792] [11.72] [5.240] [12.79] 
 
     
MS2ASSETS,SLL 1.589** 0.728 43.23*** 9.355 51.32*** 
 
[0.554] [1.810] [12.17] [5.193] [13.92] 
 
     
MSDASSETS,SLL*ETA  -12.85   13.42 
 
 [18.31]   [12.13] 
 
     
MS2ASSETS,SLL*ETA  8.795   -23.10 
 
 [18.32]   [13.20] 
 
     
MSASSETS,SLL*lnTA   2.533***  2.450*** 
 
  [0.705]  [0.666] 
 
     
MS2ASSETS,SLL*lnTA   -2.743***  -2.785*** 
 
  [0.776]  [0.773] 
 
     
MSASSETS,SLL*lnNPLL    -0.748 -0.484 
 
   [0.531] [0.413] 
 
     
MS2ASSETS,SLL*lnNPLL    0.866 0.575 
    [0.547] [0.434] 
      
Log	likelihood 3601.9822 3604.7771 3661.0394 3610.6533 3670.737 
Wald 128652.77 127467.98 130247.75 127610.44 129379.05 
      𝝈𝑼           
Constant -1.253*** -1.247*** -1.069*** -1.279*** -1.125*** 
 
[0.289] [0.294] [0.280] [0.283] [0.280] 𝝈𝑽           
Constant -4.360*** -4.365*** -4.356*** -4.360*** -4.362*** 
  [0.0464] [0.0466] [0.0467] [0.0462] [0.0459] 
N 7325 7325 7325 7325 7325 
Notes: Logit tranformation of FS: lnFS=ln(1+(FS/100));  Logit tranformation of NPLL: lNPLL=ln(1+(NPLL/100)); Standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p 
< 0.001 
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Table 8d. SFA Regressions to estimate the relationship between financial stability, market concentration and other determinants 
  (A3) (B3) (C3) (D3) (E3) 
Determinants of inefficiency of financial 
stability           
CB's -3.768* -3.894* -4.905* -3.967* -0.352 
 [1.537] [1.621] [2.069] [1.595] [0.480] 
      
NO CB's 1.686*** 1.699*** 2.187*** 1.612*** 1.653*** 
 [0.377] [0.397] [0.497] [0.367] [0.370] 
      
ln(TA) -0.0913** -0.0963** -0.130*** -0.0801** -0.0968** 
 [0.0295] [0.0318] [0.0395] [0.0286] [0.0316] 
      
ETA -1.093* -0.852 -1.273* -1.099* -0.575 
 [0.490] [0.445] [0.568] [0.482] [0.336] 
      
lNPLL 0.0733*** 0.0735*** 0.0724*** 0.0835*** 0.0390** 
 [0.0198] [0.0204] [0.0193] [0.0213] [0.0130] 
      
MS LOANS,PROV -4.733** -1.083 -55.94** -19.04* -11.30 
 [1.679] [2.582] [17.52] [8.226] [6.702] 
      
MS2LOANS,PROV 2.914* 0.841 52.12** 14.96 13.51 
 [1.183] [2.899] [16.90] [8.299] [7.210] 
      
MSLOANS,PROV*ETA  -35.99   0.349 
  [30.56]   [7.776] 
      
MS2LOANS,PROV*ETA  19.90   -4.212 
  [31.01]   [9.733] 
      
MSLOANS,PROV*lnTA   3.253**  0.563 
   [1.005]  [0.353] 
      
MS2LOANS,PROV*lnTA   -3.147**  -0.770 
   [1.012]  [0.395] 
      
MSLOANS,PROV*lnNPLL    -1.493* -0.167 
    [0.730] [0.252] 
      
MS2LOANS,PROV*lnNPLL    1.249 0.0912 
    [0.816] [0.311] 
      
Log	likelihood 3551.5248 3559.2153 3609.5335 3564.7314 2779.95 
Wald 129922.15 129463.97 131175.89 127376.48 142037.52 
      𝝈𝑼      
Constant -1.122*** -1.093*** -0.943** -1.103*** -1.599*** 
 
[0.317] [0.327] [0.311] [0.314] [0.308] 𝝈𝑽           
Constant -4.368*** -4.364*** -4.367*** -4.369*** -4.202*** 
  [0.0479] [0.0491] [0.0478] [0.0486] [0.0428] 
N 7325 7325 7325 7325 7325 
Notes: Logit tranformation of FS: lnFS=ln(1+(FS/100));  Logit tranformation of NPLL: lNPLL=ln(1+(NPLL/100)); Standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p 
< 0.001 
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Table 8e. SFA Regressions to estimate the relationship between financial stability, market concentration and other determinants 
  (A4) (B4) (C4) (D4) (E4) 
Determinants of inefficiency of 
financial stability           
CB's -3.560* -3.509 -4.044* -3.773* -3.974* 
 [1.813] [1.811] [1.879] [1.854] [1.873] 
           
NO CB's 2.519*** 2.503*** 2.889*** 2.500*** 2.764*** 
 [0.686] [0.683] [0.708] [0.671] [0.699] 
           
ln(TA) -0.176** -0.176** -0.194** -0.170** -0.185** 
 [0.0591] [0.0591] [0.0624] [0.0575] [0.0582] 
           
ETA -1.469* -1.389* -1.697* -1.581* -1.661* 
 [0.720] [0.706] [0.762] [0.741] [0.748] 
           
lNPLL 0.0949** 0.0937** 0.0927*** 0.106** 0.0974*** 
 [0.0323] [0.0323] [0.0263] [0.0342] [0.0288] 
      
MS LOANS,REG -5.766* -2.932 -110.2** -31.65* -126.8** 
 [2.421] [6.699] [37.40] [14.06] [45.65] 
           
MS2LOANS,REG 6.015* 2.775 146.6** 26.48 162.6** 
 [2.555] [7.957] [50.55] [14.34] [60.72] 
           
MSLOANS,REG*ETA   -27.40     -16.23 
   [68.94]     [33.20] 
           
MS2LOANS,REG*ETA   31.66     14.63 
   [83.25]     [46.07] 
           
MSLOANS,REG*lnTA     6.451**   6.196** 
     [2.174]   [2.122] 
           
MS2LOANS,REG*lnTA     -8.791**   -8.334** 
     [3.038]   [2.934] 
           
MSLOANS,REG*lnNPLL       -2.708* -2.375* 
       [1.276] [1.124] 
           
MS2LOANS,REG*lnNPLL       2.077 2.620 
        [1.334] [1.682] 
	      
Log	likelihood 3486.2636 3486.6386 3547.0663 3499.5561 3556.5978 
Wald 138107.78  137358.01  144879.68  136435.95 135377.26 
      𝝈𝑼      
Constant -0.971* -0.979* -0.889** -0.936* -0.912** 
 
[0.390] [0.394] [0.341] [0.380] [0.350] 𝝈𝑽           
Constant -4.375*** -4.374*** -4.391*** -4.380*** -4.390*** 
  [0.0496] [0.0502] [0.0480] [0.0492] [0.0497] 
N 7325 7325 7325 7325 7325 
Notes: Logit tranformation of FS: lnFS=ln(1+(FS/100));  Logit tranformation of NPLL: lNPLL=ln(1+(NPLL/100)); Standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p 
< 0.001 
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Figure 1 – Boxplots of financial stability and of market concentration by macro-areas 			
	
